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POST-PENETRATION RAPE-INCREASING THE
PENALTY
I. INTRODUCTION
The crime of rape' has changed dramatically in the recent
past.' Until ten years ago, if a man raped a woman' he knew,
the woman would probably fail to report the rape and it was
also probable that a court would not convict the man.4 How-
l. Section 261 of the California Penal Code provides:
261. Rape defined
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not
the spouse of tile perpetrator, under any of tihe following circunmstanc-
es:
(1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder or de-
velopmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, and this is
known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the
act ....
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of
force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the person or another.
(3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, administered by or
with the privity of the accused.
(4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the
act, and this is known to the accused.
(5) Where a person submits under the belief that the person commit-
ting the act is the victim's spouse, and this belief is induced by any
artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced by the accused, with intent
to induce the belief.
(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by threat-
ening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other per-
son, and there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will
execute the threat ....
(7) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by threat-
ening to use the authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or
deport the victim or another, and the victim has a reasonable belief
that the perpetrator is a public official.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988).
2. For example, as in many other states, California has enacted a rape shield
law. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103 (West 1988). In general, rape shield laws prohibit
the use of opinion or reputation evidence of the complaining witness in order to
prove consent. Id.
3. Although the author realizes that men may also be the victims of rape,
because the vast majority of rape victims are women, the female pronoun will be
used throughout this comment for clarity and consistency.
4. Krasnow, When a Date Becomes a Nightmare: Rapes by Acquaintances May Be
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ever, when women began to realize that rape was not always
committed by strange, unknown men lurking in alleys, they
began to report the rapes. This type of rape by an ac-
quaintance has been termed date rape.5
This comment will examine a situation somewhat similar
to date rape which the author will term "post-penetration
rape. 6 In post-penetration rape, unlike date rape, the woman
initially consents to the intercourse with the defendant. Howev-
er, at some later time during the intercourse, for whatever
reason, 7 the woman makes it clear that she no longer consents
and therefore wishes to terminate the sexual intercourse.' Al-
though the victim makes her wishes clear to the defendant, he
forces her to continue the sexual intercourse against her will.
Under current California law, post-penetration rape is not
punished as rape but may be punished as an assault or bat-
tery.' People v. Vela"° was the first California case to address
the issue of post-penetration rape. The background of this
Our Most Undermponted Crime, L.A. Daily J., May 29, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
5. Date rape occurs when a woman is forced against her will to engage in
sexual intercourse with a man with whom she is acquainted. The woman never
consents to the intercourse.
6. Tie term "post-penetration rape" was coined by the author for the sake
of clarity, and is not used by either the legal or medical profession. Although
penetration is required for rape, the penetration need only be slight. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 263 (West 1988). Therefore, vaginal penetration is not required, but pen-
etration of the external genital organs (the labia) is sufficient. People v. Karsai,
131 Cal. App. 3d 224, 232, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406, 411 (1982).
7. The facts of the cases are usually in dispute and often do not indicate
why the victim withdrew her consent. In one case, although the victim alleged that
the defendant forced her to have intercotrse against her will, the defendant tes-
tified that the intercourse was consensual, but remembered the victim suddenly
declaring, "I guess I don't want to do this anymore." State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d
1067, 1069 (Me. 1985). In another case, the victim testified that she did not
consent to the sexual intercourse. However, the defendant testified that it was
consensual, but admitted that "toward the end of the sexual [intercourse] he
became violent, pulling [tile victim's] hair and choking her." State v. Brodniak,
221 Mont. 212, 216, 718 P.2d 322, 325 (1986). These cases illustrate two of the
many possible reasons a woman may withdraw her consent. However, the reason
for the withdrawal of the consent is not as crucial as the defendant's forcing the
victim to continue sexual intercourse with force and against her will.
8. The woman must communicate hier withdrawal of consent to the defen-
dant. The fact that a woman changes her mind does not turn the originally
consensual intercourse into rape. See State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Me.
1985). It is only when she communicates her withdrawal of consent to the defen-
dant and he continues with force and against her will that a rape occurs. Id.
9. People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1985).
10. Id.
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comment begins by exploring recent societal and legal changes
in marital and acquaintance rape as two possible factors lead-
ing to the recent occurrence of post-penetration rape cases.
The background then discusses statutes and cases applicable to
post-penetration rape. The background concludes with a brief
discussion of the relevance of Rape Trauma Syndrome to
post-penetration rape. The analysis will discuss two contrasting
views of post-penetration rape. One view is embodied by the
California Court of Appeal case, People v. Vela." The other
view is found in a Maine Supreme Court case, State v. Robin-
son.12 This comment concludes with a proposed statute which
would increase the penalty of a post-penetration rape convic-
tion in California from an assault or battery to second degree
rape.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand post-penetration rape, one need
only view the changes which have occurred in rape law in the
past twenty years. Reform in the areas of marital and acquain-
tance rape have allowed women in post-penetration rape cases
to bring charges against their partners. A brief review of mari-
tal and acquaintance rape helps illustrate why women have re-
cently initiated prosecutions in post-penetration rape situations
which they would not have considered bringing only a few
years earlier.
A. Marital Rape
Under common law, a man could not be convicted of
raping his wife. This concept was named the "marital rape
exception" and until recently was followed in most states. How-
ever, by 1985, twenty-three states considered marital rape a
crime.' The remaining twenty-seven states can be divided in-
to two categories; twenty-three states allow prosecution for
marital rape only if the husband and wife are separated, and
four states prohibit prosecution for marital rape altogether.1
4
Many state legislatures proposed changes in marital rape
11. Id.
12. 496 A.2d 1067 (1985).
13. 16 CRIM. JUST. NEWL. 5, Jan. 16, 1985, No. 2.
14. Id.
1991]
782 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
laws after an Oregon trial court in State v. Rideout"5 acquitted
the defendant of raping his wife. Rideout attracted national
attention which initiated reform of the marital rape laws in
many states."6 In California, for example, the legislature en-
acted a new section in the penal code to provide for prosecu-
tion of marital rape. 7 The legislature enacted this section in
1979. There are conditions precedent, however, to the applica-
bility of the California marital rape law. For example, a woman
is barred from prosecuting her husband if she does not report
the rape within ninety days.'8 Section 261 of the California
Penal Code, which defines forcible rape,' 9 does not have a
comparable limitation. 0
In addition to marital rape, society's increased awareness
of acquaintance rape may have made it easier for women in
post-penetration rape cases to press charges against their part-
ners. The next section briefly reviews acquaintance rape in the
context of post-penetration rape.
15. No. 108866 (Marion County, Or. Cir. Ct., Dec. 27, 1978).
16. 16 CRIM. JUST. NEWL. 5, Jan. 16, 1985, No. 2.
17. Section 26 2(a) of the California Penal Code provides in relevant part:
262(a). Rape of Spouse
Rape of a person who is the spouse of a perpetrator is an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished against the will of the spouse by
means of force or fear of immecliate and unlawful bodily injury on
the spouse or another, or where the act is accomplished against the
victim's will or any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility
that the perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this subdivi-
sion "threatening to retaliate" means a threat to kidnap or falsely
imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a) (West 1988).
18. Section 262(b) of the California Penal Code provides in relevant part:
262(b). Rape of Spouse
There shall be no arrest or prosecution under this section unless the
violation of this section is reported to a peace officer having the
power to arrest for a violation of this section or to the district attor-
ney of the county in which the violation occurred, within 90 days
after the day of the violation.
Id. § 262(b).
19. For the sake of clarity, the term "forcible rape" will be used to denote a
situation in which a defendant forces a woman to engage in sexual intercourse
without her consent. In contrast, the term "post-penetration rape" will be used to
describe a situation in which a woman initially consents to sexual intercourse, but
withdraws her consent at some point after penetration.
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988).
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B. Acquaintance Rape
As recently as 1985, a prosecutor in New York said it was
nearly impossible to take a date rape case to trial because of
three factors: (1) state law; (2) lack of public support; and (3)
the victim's reluctance to become involved.2 ' However, as in-
dicated previously, the public has become more aware of the
incidence of date rape. Perhaps as a result of the
criminalization of marital rape in many states and the in-
creased number of convictions in date rape cases, courts have
begun to hear cases involving post-penetration rape. The liber-
alization of rape laws throughout the country has created a less
hostile environment for rape victims. For example, in previous
years if a woman were raped while on a date, she was unlikely
to report the crime because of her belief that a jury would
equate her consent to the date with consent to sexual inter-
course. This was due to the fact that prior to the recent in-
crease in date rape cases, most juries considered rape to be a
situation in which a man who is not known to his victim forces
her to engage in sexual intercourse.
Just as marital rape and date rape gave women the protec-
tion they had previously been denied, an increased penalty for
post-penetration rape will also protect women who are now
inadequately protected. In addition, punishing post-penetration
rape as rape instead of as assault or battery will also protect
victims of date rape who initially consent to sexual intercourse
but later withdraw their consent after penetration.
This comment suggests that just as legislatures enacted
changes in the marital rape exception after Rideout, the Califor-
nia legislature should change the California Penal Code to
define post-penetration rape as a rape instead of an assault or
battery. The only California case that has addressed the issue
of post-penetration rape is People v. Vela. 23 Because the Vela
court had little case law to rely upon for guidance, it examined
other jurisdictions' 24 treatment of the issue as well as sections
21. L.A. Daily J., May 29, 1985, at 4, col. 3.
22. Id.
23. 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 241, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (1985).
24. Id. at 241-42, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
1991]
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261 and 263 of the California Penal Code.25 This comment
will discuss the various rape statutes before focusing on the
applicable case law.
C. Statutes
The California Penal Code lists seven circumstances consti-
tuting rape. In general, two of these circumstances are relevant
to post-penetration rape:
261. Rape defined
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the
following circumstances:
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by
means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and unlaw-
ful bodily injury on the person or another ....
(6) Where the act is accomplished against the victim's will
by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim
or any other person, and there is a reasonable possibility
that the perpetrator will execute the threat. As used in this
paragraph "threatening to retaliate" means a threat to
kidnap or falsely imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, seri-
ous bodily injury or death.26
Subdivision two illustrates a situation where the victim
submits to sexual intercourse because of threats of immediate
harm such as "if you do not have sex with me I'll kill you." On
the other hand, subdivision six involves a situation where the
victim submits to sexual intercourse because of future threats
of harm such as "if you do not have sex with me I'll find your
daughter and kill her."
The statute also addresses two issues important in
post-penetration rape: consent and penetration. The first issue,
consent, is discussed in section 261.6.27 This section defines
consent as "positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to
an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and volun-
tarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transac-
tion involved." 2' The quoted language ensures that consent is
given voluntarily and not as a result of fear.29 In a forcible
25. Id. at 242-43, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988).
27. Id. § 261.6.
28. Id.
29. People v. Key, 153 Cal. App. 3d 888, 895, 203 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
[Vol. 31
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rape case the issue of consent focuses on whether the victim
consented to the sexual intercourse. Typically, the victim ar-
gues that she never consented to the sexual intercourse."0 In
contrast, the defendant usually counters with one of two argu-
ments. The defendant may allege the victim consented." On
the other hand, the defendant may assert that although the
victim did not consent, he reasonably and in good faith
thought she did."
The first issue in post-penetration rape involves penetra-
tion. The concept of penetration is crucial to the crime of rape
because there can be no rape without penetration. If the de-
fendant does not penetrate the victim, the court will not find
the defendant guilty of rape, but may convict him of assault or
battery."3 This analysis leads to the conclusion that when pen-
etration takes place without consent a rape has occurred.
The second issue in a post-penetration rape case involves
(1984).
30. See, e.g., State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 294-95, 254 S.E.2d 760, 760-61
(1979).
31. Id. at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 761.
32. CALJIC § 10.23 provides:
It is a defense to a charge of forcible rape that the defendant enter-
tained a reasonable and good faith belief that the female person vol-
untarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse. If from all the evi-
dence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant reasonably
and in good faith believed she voluntarily consented to engage in
sexual intercourse, you must give the defendant the benefit of that
doubt and acquit him of said charge.
"Reasonable and good faith belief" is a legal term. A reasonable belief is
one which a reasonable person would have in the defendant's circumstances.
Good faith means that at the time of the alleged rape, the defendant actually
believed the woman consented. See Peoplc v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155, 542
P.2d 1337, 1345, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 753 (1075).
33. Assault and battery are defined in sections 240 and 242 of the California
Penal Code.
Section 240 defines assault as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person or another." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 240 (Deering 1985). The punishment for assault is a fine not to exceed
$1000.00 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months or
both. Id. § 241.
Battery is defined as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon the person of another." Id. § 242. Battery is punished by a fine of not
more than $2000.00 or confinement in the county jail for not more than six
months or both. Id. § 243.
In contrast to the punishments for assault or battery, a conviction for rape
is punishable by confinement in the state prison for three, six, or eight years. Id.
§ 264.
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consent.3 4 However, in a post-penetration rape case, unlike
the typical forcible rape situation, the issue is whether a victim
who initially consents to sexual intercourse with a defendant
can withdraw her consent after penetration. Therefore, al-
though the issue of consent arises in forcible rape and
post-penetration rape, the major distinction between the two
involves timing. In a forcible rape case, the victim must con-
sent at the moment of penetration or the defendant becomes
guilty of rape. 5 The situation changes somewhat in a
post-penetration rape case because the victim admits she con-
sented at the moment of penetration but alleges she revoked
her consent sometime thereafter during intercourse.3 6
Following the above analysis, the California courts exam-
ine the point of penetration to determine whether the victim
consented to the sexual intercourse." For example, if the de-
fendant penetrates the victim without her consent, the victim
is unable to later change her mind and allege that she did
consent.38 On the other hand, under current California law, if
the defendant penetrates the victim with her consent, the vic-
tim can later withdraw her consent without the interruption of
penetration.3 ' However, the defendant will not be guilty of
rape, but may be guilty of an assault or battery.4 °
The preceding section illustrated the penal code sections
applicable to post-penetration rape. The following section dis-
cusses California's interpretation of these statutes. The follow-
ing section also examines the treatment post-penetration rape
receives in other jurisdictions.
34. The definition of consent in the crime of rape is defined in section 261.6
of the California Penal Code as "positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant
to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have
knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved." CAL. PENAL CODE §
261.6 (West 1988).
35. See, e.g., People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 242, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161,
164 (1985).
36. Id. at 240, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
37. Id. at 242, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
38. Id. at 243, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 243, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
[Vol. 31
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D. Cases
1. United States Cases
a. California's Treatment of Post-Penetration Rape
As indicated previously, the California courts have consid-
ered the issue of post-penetration rape only once, in People v.
Vela.4 Because the issue was one of first impression, the
court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance.42 In Vela, the
defendant was charged with forcible rape of a 14-year-old
child.4" The prosecution presented evidence strong enough to
convict the defendant of forcible rape.44 However, the prose-
cution also presented evidence of the defendant's statement to
a deputy which indicated the victim initially consented to the
act of sexual intercourse, but changed her mind in mid-act.45
Although the victim communicated her withdrawal of consent
to the defendant, he continued the act of sexual intercourse
with force46 and against her will.47
The jury requested instructions from the trial court on the
following question: "Once penetration has occurred with the
female's consent, if the female changes her mind does force
from that point (where she changes her mind) constitute
rape?"4" The court answered yes and the jury convicted the
defendant of rape.
4 9
41. Id. at 242, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
42. Id. at 241-42, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
43. Because of the age of the victim, the defendant was also guilty of unlaw-
ful sexual intercourse with a female tinder the age of 18 under section 261.5 of
the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1988). This section addresses
what is commonly known as statutory rape. Id. In statutory rape cases, unlike forc-
ible rape cases, consent is not at issue because a female under the age of 18 is
unable to consent to intercourse. People v. MacDonald, 167 Cal. 545, 140 P. 256
(1914). Therefore, in People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 31 237, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161
(1985), because the victim was under age and did not consent to the intercourse,
the defendant could be charged with both forcible and statutory rape.
44. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 240, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
45. Id.
46. The definition of force, in the crime of rape, is not that degree of force
which may produce bodily injury, but is the force needed to overcome the resis-
tance made by the victim. People v. Mcllvain, 55 Cal. App. 2d 322, 329, 130 P.2d
131, 134-35 (1942).
47. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 240, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
48. Id., 218 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
49. The judge then became unsure whether his instruction was an accurate
1991]
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The court of appeal addressed the validity of the trial
court's jury instructions. Before reversing the trial court's deci-
sion, the court of appeal analyzed two cases from other juris-
dictions.
b. Maryland's Treatment of Post-Penetration Rape
The Vela court first examined Battle v. State,5" a Maryland
Supreme Court case, which addressed an issue identical to that
presented to the Vela court. In Battle, the victim was a 44-year
old grandmother. She parked her car at a lot where the de-
fendant worked. When she returned to her car she noticed
that the defendant had washed it. She told the defendant that
she did not have any money, and he asked for a ride home
instead. During the ride to the defendant's home, the defen-
dant informed the victim that he wished to sell his radio.
When they arrived at the defendant's home, the victim agreed
to go to the defendant's room to look at the radio because she
felt she could trust him since he looked like "a nice old
man."51
At this point, the testimony of the defendant and the vic-
tim conflicted. The victim alleged that once she entered the
defendant's room he "got nasty"52 and ordered her to take
her clothes off. When she replied, "[y]ou [sic] got to be kid-
ding,"5 he placed a screwdriver against her head and repeat-
ed his order. He also threatened to kill her, adding that he had
killed once before. The victim stated that the defendant then
forced her to engage in sexual intercourse against her will. The
defendant alleged that although the victim asked him to have
sexual intercourse with her, he refused and no sexual contact
occurred.5
reflection of California law. Because of this, the judge polled tile jurors on tile
effect of the instructions on their decision to convict the defendant of rape. Ten
jurors said they based their decisions on the judge's instructions and two said they
did not. The court then ordered the jury to return to deliberation without any
further instructions. In other words, the judge instructed the jury to disregard his
previous instruction but offered no substitute instruction in its place. The jury
again convicted the defendant of rape. 1d., 218 Cal. Rptr. at 163.
50. 287 Md. 675, 684, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (1980).
51. Id. at 676-77, 414 A.2d at 1267.
52. Id. at 677, 414 A.2d at 1267.
53. Id.
54. Battle, 287 Md. at 678, 414 A.2d at 1267. The facts in this case illustrate
788 [Vol. 31
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After deliberating, the jury asked the court for guidance
on the following question: "[w]hen a possible consensual sexu-
al relationship becomes nonconsensual for some reason during
the course of the action-can the act then be considered rape?"
The trial judge instructed the jury that "it is possible for a
situation to start out as consensual and then become...
nonconsensual in the course of the event."55 The jury then
convicted the defendant of assault with intent to rape.'
The defendant appealed his conviction alleging that the
jury instructions were ambiguous and therefore the case
should be reversed and remanded. The Maryland Supreme
Court examined the issue of consent before deciding to re-
verse and remand the case. The court reached its decision
after examining two situations.
The first situation examined by the court involved a defen-
dant who forced the victim to engage in sexual intercourse
against her will. However, sometime after the intercourse, the
victim decided to consent to the intercourse. This situation
clearly constitutes rape because the law does not allow a per-
son to retroactively consent to a crime."
The court then considered a second situation in which the
female initially consented to the sexual intercourse, but
withdrew her consent prior to penetration.5" As in the first
the wide disparity between the victim's and the defendant's description of tile
facts in post-penetration rape.
55. Id. at 678-79, 414 A.2d at 1268.
56. Maryland law punishes assault with intent to rape more severely than
assault. See Christensen v. State, 33 Md. App. 635, 640, 365 A.2d 562, 565 (1976).
The elements of assault with intent to rape are "(a) an assault, (b) an intention to
have [sexual intercourse with] a female, and (c) with force and against the consent
of the female. Middleton v. State, 6 Md. App. 380, 383, 251 A.2d 224, 227
(1969). An assault is defined as a threat to inflict injury on another together with
the apparent ability to do so. BLACK'S Lt.w DICTIONARY 105 (5th ed. 1979).
57. An appellate court reverses a lower court lecision by making it void.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1185 (5th ed. 1979). Oil the other hand, a remand
occurs when an appellate court sends a case back to the trial court so that fur-
ther action can be taken. Id. at 1162.
58. Battle, 287 Md. at 681, 414 A.2d at 1269. The rationale behind not
allowing a woman to retroactively consent to a crime is usually described with
respect to the state's interest in criminal prosecutions. In other words, because a
prosecutor represents the public and not the victim, the fact that a victim believes
she was not injured is irrelevant. The injury to the public remains. Id. at 682, 414
A.2d at 1269-70 (quoting W. LFAVE AND A. SConI', HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAw 57 (1972)).
59. Id. at 682, 414 A.2d at 1270.
1991]
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situation, because the defendant accomplished the penetration
with force, a rape occurred.60
After examining the legal analysis in the above two situa-
tions, the Maryland court concluded that the victim must grant
consent prior to penetration. The court applied its conclusion
to the post-penetration rape case and decided that if a woman
consented prior to penetration but withdrew her consent
sometime thereafter, no rape had occurred. 61
c. North Carolina's Treatment of Post-Penetration Rape
Vela also examined a North Carolina Supreme Court deci-
sion, State v. Way.62 The facts of Way, like Vela and Battle,
were in dispute. The victim and the defendant talked on the
phone regularly but had never dated. On the date of the al-
leged rape, the defendant and the victim picked up a friend of
the victim's. The trio then went to another person's apartment
where everyone except the victim drank beer or wine and
smoked marijuana. A short time after they arrived, the defen-
dant asked the victim to accompany him upstairs because he
wanted to show something to her. He took her to an upstairs
bedroom and attempted to undress her. When the victim at-
tempted to stop the defendant, he told her that if she did not
comply with his demands he would beat her. The victim tried
to escape but the defendant punched her in the face. She also
tried to call her friend but the defendant informed her that by
the time her friend arrived, the victim's "head would be
through the wall." '63 The defendant forced the victim to en-
gage in anal and vaginal intercourse with him. He also forced
her to perform fellatio. 4
During the act of sexual intercourse, the victim experi-
enced severe pain in her stomach. This scared the defendant
and he called the victim's friend for help. The defendant and
the victim's friend then took the victim to the hospital. The
doctor who examined the victim observed that she had bruises
and swelling on her face, and her vagina showed evidence of
60. Id. at 683-85, 414 A.2d at 1270.
61. Id. at 683, 414 A.2d at 1270.
62. 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979).
63. Id. at 294-95, 251 S.E.2d at 760-61.
64. Fellatio is "oral stimulation of [lic penis." WEBSTFR'S NINTi NEW COLLE-
GIATE DICTIONARY 455 (1988).
[Vol. 31
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recent trauma. In addition, the doctor noted that her
hymen65 had recently torn.
The defendant alleged the victim initially consented to the
sexual intercourse and that during the act she began com-
plaining about stomach pains. The defendant stated that he
then called the victim's friend and they drove the victim to the
hospital.66
During deliberations, the jury asked whether consent
could be withdrawn after penetration.67 The court replied
"yes1 68 and the jury convicted the defendant of second de-
gree rape.69
After the court of appeal affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion, he appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
The supreme court granted a new trial based on the fact that
although consent can be withdrawn after penetration, this
usually occurs in cases involving more than one act of sexual
intercourse.7 ° The court stated that this situation usually aris-
es when a woman consents to an initial act of sexual inter-
course with the defendant. However, at some point after the
initial consensual act of intercourse, the woman withdraws her
consent and is forced into subsequent acts against her will. In
this situation, the nonconsensual acts of sexual intercourse will
be considered rape.7' However, the court refused to extend
this concept to post-penetration rape situations.
72
65. Way, 297 N.C. at 294-95, 254 S.E.2d at 761. The hymen is a membrane
covering the opening of the vagina. BLACK'S L-W DICTIONARY 591 (5th ed. 1979).
66. Way, 297 N.C. at 295-96, 254 S.E.2d at 761.
67. Id. at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 761.
68. The judge's instructions stated that "consent initially given could be
withdrawn and if the intercourse continued through use of force or threat of
force and that the act at that point was no longer consensual this would consti-
tute the crime of rape." 1(.
69. North Carolina has two degrees of rape. A defendant is guilty of first de-
gree rape if he engages in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and
against the person's will under any of the following situations:
(a) While using or displaying a dangerous weapon.
(b) While inflicting serious personal injury on the victim or another.
(c) While aided and abetted by another person or persons.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1986).
Second degree rape is defined as engaging in vaginal intercourse either (a)
by force and against the will of another person or (b) with a person who is "men-
tally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless." Id. § 14-27.3.
70. Way, 297 N.C. at 296, 254 S.E.2d at 761.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 296-97, 254 S.E.2d at 761-62.
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Based upon an analysis of these two cases, the court in
People v. Vela" held that a defendant who forced a woman to
continue sexual intercourse against her will is not guilty of
rape, but may be charged with an assault or battery. An equal-
ly important case dealing with post-penetration rape which was
not addressed by the Vela court was State v. Robinson"4 which
is discussed in the following section.
d. Maine's Treatment of Post-Penetration Rape
The Supreme Court of Maine affirmed a defendant's con-
viction of post-penetration rape in State v. Robinson.75 As with
the other cases, the facts of Robinson were in dispute. The vic-
tim testified that the defendant appeared at her door saying
that he ran out of gasoline and needed to use her telephone.
She allowed him to enter, but instead of using the phone, he
joined her in the living room where she was watching a movie.
The victim alleged the defendant then forced her to have sexu-
al intercourse against her will. However, the defendant alleged
that the victim consented to the intercourse although some-
time during the act she said, "I guess I don't want to do this
anymore."76 The defendant alleged that he then dressed and
left. 7
During deliberations, the jury asked the judge for instruc-
tions on the following question: "If two people begin consent-
ing to an act, then one person says no and the other contin-
ues-is that rape?"7" The judge replied:
If a couple consensually engages in sexual intercourse and
one or the other changes his or her mind, and communi-
cates the revocation or change of mind of the consent,
and the other partner continues the sexual intercourse by
compulsion ... then it would be rape. The critical element
73. 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1985).
74. 496 A.2d 1067 (1985). Allhough the court in People v. Vela examined
other jurisdictions before reaching its decision, there is no mention of State v.
Robinson. The Vela court was unable to examine the Robinson decision because the
two cases were decided at essentially the sane time. If the Robinson case were
decided before Vela, however, it is likely the California court would have analyzed
the Maine case before reaching its own decision.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1069.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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there is the continuation under compulsion.79
After receiving the court's instructions, the jury convicted
the defendant of class A rape and he appealed."0
On appeal, the defendant asserted that an act of initially
consensual sexual intercourse was not transformed into rape
when a woman withdrew her consent after penetration. The
defendant admitted, however, that if a man compels a woman
to continue the sexual intercourse under these circumstances
he may be convicted of simple or aggravated assault, but not
rape. The appellate court disagreed with the defendant and
held that a man who compelled a woman to continue sexual inter-
course after she revoked her consent was guilty of rape.8'
The court also disagreed with State v. Way.82 The Robin-
son court believed that Way would allow a woman's mere
change of mind to transform an initially consensual sexual
intercourse into rape. s The Robinson court emphasized that
intercourse did not become rape when the victim changed her
mind. The act turned into rape:
[I]f and when the prosecutrix thereafter submitted to
defendant's sexual assault only because of physical force,
threats of physical force or a combination thereof...
[made her] unable to physically repel the [defendant]
or ... produce[d] in [her] a reasonable fear that death,
serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently
inflicted upon [her].'
In other words, the significant factor was continuation of
sexual intercourse under compulsion. Therefore, if a defen-
dant physically forced a woman against her will to continue
intercourse with him after she revoked her original consent, he
79. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1068-69.
80. Id. Maine law formerly grouped crimes into classes for sentencing purpos-
es. Under the 1983 criminal code, penalties were provided for each class (class A,
B, C, D, and E) instead of each crime. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 4 com-
ment (1983).
81. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069.
82. 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979).
83. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070.
84. Id. A prosecutrix is a female who prosecutes another person for a crime
in the name of the government and is used to describe the woman alleging the
crime of rape. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1099-1100 (5th ed. 1979). Courts
now commonly use the terms complainant or victim. In addition, the court may
use the woman's given name.
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then became guilty of rape. 5 This situation can be contrasted
with that found in State v. Way which would allow a mere
change of the victim's mind to transform an initially consensu-
al sexual intercourse into rape. Therefore, in Way, the defen-
dant could be found guilty of rape even though the victim did
not communicate her withdrawal of consent to the defendant.
Because of the lack of United States cases on the issue, it
may be helpful to examine the treatment given to
post-penetration rape in foreign jurisdictions. A New Zealand
court recently decided a post-penetration rape case. As New
Zealand law is based on English law (as is American law), New
Zealand precedent is helpful in analyzing the issue of
post-penetration rape, especially in light of the fact that there
are so few American cases on the subject.
2. New Zealand's Treatment of Post-penetration Rape
A recent New Zealand case, Kaitamaki v. The Queen,8 6 ad-
dressed an issue identical to that in Vela.87 In Kaitamaki, the
defendant broke into the victim's home. The fact that two acts
of sexual intercourse occurred was not in dispute. The defen-
dant argued that both acts were initially consensual, but that
after the second act of penetration, he realized the woman no
longer consented. However, the defendant did not cease hav-
ing sexual intercourse with the woman after her withdrawal of
consent.
88
The trial judge instructed the jury "that if, having realised
she is not willing, he continues with the act of intercourse, it
then became rape., 89 The defendant alleged that the instruc-
tion was an incorrect statement of the law and therefore ap-
pealed to the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The defendant
argued that under the law of New Zealand, if penetration is
initially consensual, a man cannot be guilty of rape if he con-
tinued the sexual intercourse after he realized the woman no
85. Id. at 1071.
86. 1985 App. Cas. 147 (1985).
87. The issue in Kaitamaki, as in People v. Vela, involved the question of
whether a woman who intitally consents to sexual interocurse can withdraw her
consent after penetration.
88. Kailamaki, 1985 App. Cas. at 151.
89. Id.
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longer consented.9"
The New Zealand Court of Appeal based its affirmation of
the trial court's decision on the construction of sections 127
and 128 of the Crimes Act."' Section 127 defines sexual inter-
course as "complete upon penetration."92 The relevant por-
tions of section 128 defined rape as "the act of a male person
having sexual intercourse with a woman or girl... [w]ithout
her consent."" The defendant's only argument was that be-
cause rape is defined as penetration without consent, once
penetration is complete the act of intercourse is finished.
Therefore, the defendant contended that if intercourse is con-
tinued after consent is withdrawn, the defendant is not guilty
of rape because the intercourse is complete upon penetra-
tion. 4
The court of appeal rejected the defendant's argument
because the purpose of section 127 was to establish the mini-
mum conduct required to prove sexual intercourse.9 5 The
court explained that the term "complete" did not mean being
at an end as the defendant alleged, but meant coming into
existence. 6 Therefore, the court concluded that sexual inter-
course is a continuing act which ends with withdrawal by the
male partner. Since section 128 defined rape as "having" in-
tercourse without consent, if the defendant continued inter-
course after the withdrawal of consent he was guilty of rape. 7
The defendant then appealed to the Privy Council98 which
affirmed the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision.
9
The above discussion addressed the problems of consent
and penetration in a post-penetration rape case by focusing on
relevant statutes and cases. A topic which also merits discus-
sion, but involves evidentiary problems which are indirectly
90. Id.
91. The New Zealand Court of Appeal had the same problem as the Vela
court in that there was little case law on point.
92. Crimes Act, § 127 (N.Z. Stat. 1961).
93. Id. § 128.
94. Kaitamaki, 1985 App. Cas. at 151.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 151-52.
98. The Privy Council serves as a court of ultimate appeal in certain cases.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1080 (5th ed. 1979).
99. Kaitamak4 1985 App. Cas. at 153.
1991]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
related to consent and penetration, is Rape Trauma Syndrome
(RTS). The following section explores the relevance of RTS in
a post-penetration rape.
3. Proof Problems and the Use of Rape Trauma Syndrome
One of the possible reasons for the dearth of
post-penetration rape cases involves the problem of proof. In
many rape cases the question of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence hinges upon whether the jury believes the defendant's
version of the facts or the victim's. In other words, it is the
defendant's word against the victim's. However, in forcible
rape cases there is more likely to be evidence of physical trau-
ma indicating that the sexual intercourse was not consensu-
al.' 00 In contrast, because a post-penetration rape situation
begins consensually, there is a decreased likelihood of finding
physical evidence which would indicate the sexual intercourse
was not completely consensual. Therefore, it will be more diffi-
cult for a prosecutor to prove a post-penetration rape case
than a forcible rape case. This problem may be one of the
reasons so few post-penetration rape cases are prosecuted.
A possible solution to the proof problem in
post-penetration rape cases would be the introduction of evi-
dence of RTS to aid in the determination of whether the sexu-
al intercourse was completely consensual. RTS is one of a
group of psychiatric disorders collectively known as Post Trau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD).' ° Other traumatic events in-
cluding military combat, bombing and torture may also cause
PTSD.10
2
Women who experience RTS suffer from many of the
same symptoms, including a reliving of the rape, an inability to
maintain previously close relationships, and a general sense of
nervousness known as the startle response.'0 °
100. Examples of evidence of physical trauma would include blood inside tile
vagina, scratches, cuts and bruises. State v. Brodniak, 221 Mont. 212, 718 P.2d
322 (1986).
101. Cling, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Medical Evidence of Nonconsent, 35 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q., 154, 157 (1980).
102. Note, Experl Testimony that Rape Victim Suffered Post Traumatic Stress Dis-
order is Admissible to Rebut a Defense of Consent, 16 BALTIMORE L. REV. 141, 142
(1986).
103. E.g., Cling, supra note 102 at 157.
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Evidence of RTS would be helpful to the prosecution
because in the typical post-penetration rape case the defense
will argue that the sexual intercourse was completely consensu-
al"4 and the prosecution will argue that although the inter-
course was initially consensual, consent was withdrawn at some
point thereafter and the victim was forced to continue the act
against her will. Therefore, if the prosecution can show that
the victim suffered from RTS after the incident, the jury will
have one more piece of evidence to consider in determining
which version of the facts to believe, the defendant's or the
victim's. Unfortunately, under current California law RTS is
not admissible to prove that a rape occurred and therefore
would not be admissible to prove withdrawal of consent in a
post-penetration rape situation.0
5
III. ANALYSIS
A. Case Analysis
As previously indicated, the Vela court concluded that a
defendant in a post-penetration rape case faces an assault or
battery conviction, but not a rape conviction.
0 6
In reaching its conclusion the court engaged in deductive
reasoning. The court began with two different factual situa-
tions. In the first factual situation a woman is forced to engage
in sexual intercourse against her will. Because the intercourse
lacked consent, the woman is not allowed to subsequently
consent in order to "void" the rape. 07 The second situation
is generally thought of as date rape. In a date rape case a wom-
an may consent to various sexual acts prior to the sexual inter-
course. If the woman withdraws her consent prior to penetra-
tion, however, the act becomes rape.' From this analysis
the court concluded that the presence or absence of rape must
be determined at penetration.' ° Therefore, in a date rape
situation, the fact that the woman consented before penetra-
104. See, e.g., State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979).
105. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984).
106. People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 213, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165
(1985).
107. Id. at 242, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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tion is irrelevant because consent was not present at penetra-
tion. After examining the above two situations, the court con-
cluded "[i]t follows that if consent is given at the moment of
penetration, the act of intercourse will be shielded from being
a rape even if consent is later withdrawn during the act.""'
The court used three different sources to reinforce its
conclusion. First of all, the court looked to other states to ex-
amine their analysis in post-penetration rape situations. At the
time Vela was decided, the court could only find two cases
involving post-penetration rape, Battle v. State"' and State v.
Way." 2 As discussed supra, both cases held that a rape can-
not occur if consent is present at the moment of penetration.
The Vela court found these cases to be persuasive.
Next, the Vela court examined the California Penal Code
and found that it also focused on the moment of penetration
in determining whether consent was present. For example, the
court stated that "[i]t is well settled that '[a]ny sexual penetra-
tion, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime."'' s
From the language of this section, the court deduced that the
legislature intended that the courts determine whether consent
exists at the moment of penetration." 4 However, the court
did not reinforce this conclusion with any legislative history
and therefore it is possible that this was not the real legislative
intent. By enacting section 263, the legislature could have in-
tended to clarify the minimum requirements for a charge of
rape. For example, the legislature could have enacted the stat-
ute in response to cases such as People v. Karsai."5 In Karsai,
the defendant appealed his conviction of rape because of his
belief that he did not sufficiently penetrate his victin.' 16 The
victim testified that the defendant forced his erect penis be-
tween her labia but did not penetrate her vagina."' The
court rejected the defendant's argument that he did not pene-
trate the victim sufficiently to be charged with rape and held
110. Id.
111. 287 Md. 675, 414 A.2d 1266 (1980).
112. 297 N.C. 293, 254 S.E.2d 760 (1979).
113. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West 1988)).
114. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 242, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
115. 131 Cal. App. 3d 224, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1982).
116. Id. at 232, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
117. Id. at 232, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
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that adequate penetration had occurred.' 8 In response to
cases with facts similar to People v. Karsai,"'9 ' the legislature
could have intended to make a clear statement regarding the
degree of penetration required for a rape conviction. There-
fore, without an adequate examination of the legislative history
behind section 263, the court should not have so easily
reached its conclusion that the purpose behind the section was
to focus the determination of whether consent exists at the
moment of penetration.
Finally, the court noted that "the essence of the crime of
rape is the outrage to the person and feelings of the female
resulting from the nonconsensual violation of her woman-
hood."'2 ' The court concluded that because the outrage to
the victim is less in a post-penetration rape situation than in
the forcible rape situation, a rape could not have occurred in
the post-penetration rape situation:
If [the woman] withdraws consent during the act of sexual
intercourse and the male forcibly continues the act without
interruption, the female may certainly feel outrage because
of the force applied or because the male ignores her wish-
es, but the sense of outrage to her person and feelings
could hardly be of the same magnitude as that resulting
from an initial nonconsensual violation of her woman-
hood. It would seem, therefore, that the essential guilt of
rape as stated in Penal Code section 263 is lacking in the
withdrawn consent scenario.'
21
Although the court's conclusion is possible, it is not the
only conclusion the court could have reached. Another possi-
bility is that because post-penetration rape involves penetra-
tion, a rape has occurred. This possibility would better reflect
the current California Penal Code. The penal code differenti-
ates between sexual battery and rape. 2 2 Sexual battery
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 243, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
121. Id.
122. The definition of sexual battery is found in section 243.4 of the Penal
Code. Sexual battery is defined as touching an intimate part (the sexual organs,
anus, groin or buttocks of any person and the female's breasts) against a person's
will when the person is unlawfully restrained. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West
1988 & Supp. 1990). The Code clearly states that rape is a separate crime and is
not to be included under sexual battery. Id. The different punishments for rape
1991)
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
means the touching of an intimate part of another against the
other's will. 2 In contrast, the crime of rape requires pene-
tration.12 4 The code emphasizes that a crime involving pene-
tration cannot be classified as a sexual battery but must be
rape. 12  Therefore, because post-penetration rape involves
penetration, classifying it as sexual battery instead of rape con-
tradicts the express language of the penal code.
The Robinson court would also find fault with the Vela
court's conclusion that consent must be absent at the moment
of penetration to transform the sexual intercourse into rape.
The defendant in Robinson alleged an argument similar to the
one presented in Vela. The defendant contended that when a
woman consents to penetration, her revocation of consent
does not change the continued sexual intercourse into
rape. 126 The court rejected the defendant's argument. 21
The court felt that if it accepted the defendant's argument,
that a rape occurs only when the defendant penetrates the
victim by compulsion, the decision of whether a rape occurred
would depend on whether the woman managed to dislodge
the defendant's penis. 28 In other words, if a woman initially
consents to sexual intercourse and later withdraws her consent
two situations may arise. In the first situation, the defendant
forces the victim to continue the intercourse against her will.
Under the defendant's argument, no rape occurred. In the
second situation, the woman revokes her consent and the de-
fendant forces her to continue. However, the victim manages
to dislodge the defendant's penis. In this second situation, if
the defendant penetrates the victim again without her consent
he will be guilty of rape. The different conclusions reached in
the above two similar situations created an injustice which the
Robinson court found no logical reason to tolerate. 29 To
and sexual battery reinforce this. The puiislinent for sexual battery is either
imprisonment in the county jail for not more thain one year, or for two, three or
four years in the state prison. li. § 243.4(a). 'lie punishment for rape is iin-
prisonment in the state prison for three, six or eight years. Ld. § 264.
123. d. § 243.4.
124. See id. § 263.
125. Id. § 243.4.
126. State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1985).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1071.
129. See id.
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avoid perpetuating the injustice which would occur if the
above two situations were treated differently, the court af-
firmed the defendant's rape conviction.
The Vela court also appeared concerned about protecting
future defendants from falsified charges of post-penetration
rape. The court in State v. Way also expressed similar reserva-
tions.13 In essence, all three courts believed that a defendant
would be subject to conviction in post-penetration rape cases
merely because a woman changed her mind in midact. The
Robinson court responded to this concern. The Robinson court
argued that even in a post-penetration rape case the prosecu-
tion must prove all the elements of rape.' The court em-
phasized that the woman's revocation of consent did not
transform the sexual intercourse into rape. The act became
rape when the defendant forced the woman to continue the
sexual intercourse against her will." 2 Because of this, the
prosecution's burden in a post-penetration rape case is identi-
cal to that in forcible rape cases. In fact, the prosecutor in a
post-penetration rape case has the added burden of the
victim's initial consent. The prosecution must contend with the
fact that the average juror will in all likelihood have less sympa-
thy for a post-penetration rape victim than a forcible rape
victim.
Another argument the Robinson court did not address
which would assuage the Vela court's concerns about the possi-
bility of victims bringing false charges of post-penetration rape
against defendants involves the defendant's possible defenses.
A defendant may raise as a defense to any rape charge that he
reasonably and in good faith believed the victim consent-
ed.13 3 The strength of this defense is indicated in People v.
Hampton. 1 4 In Hampton, the court held that even if a rape
victim did not consent to sexual intercourse, if the defendant
reasonably and in good faith believed she did consent a jury
cannot convict him of rape.' This holding places an in-
creased burden on the prosecution. In addition to proving the
130. 297 N.C. 293, 296, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979).
131. See Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1070 (1985).
132. Id.
133. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
134. 118 Cal. App. 3d 324, 173 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1981).
135. Id. at 329-30, 173 Cal. Rit'. at 271.
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victim did not consent, the prosecution must convince the jury
that the defendant could not have reasonably and in good
faith believed that the victim consented.
B. Rape Trauma Syndrome
As previously discussed, the use of Rape Trauma Syn-
drome (RTS) in post-penetration rape cases may be useful in
determining whether the defendant's or victim's version of the
events is closer to the truth.
At the present time, RTS is not admissible to prove that a
rape occurred," 6 but may be admissible under other circum-
stances. For example, prosecutors may use RTS to dispel myths
about rape victims. Therefore, if the defendant alleges that the
victim's conduct after the rape is inconsistent with the "aver-
age" rape victim, the prosecution can use RTS to show the jury
that such conduct is not atypical in a rape victim. Delia v.
Torres'37 illustrates the use of RTS to dispel myths about
rape. In Torres, the defendant alleged that the victim delayed
reporting the rape which indicated that no rape had in fact oc-
curred.'3 8 The prosecution used RTS to show that victims of-
ten delay reporting rapes. The court allowed the use of RTS
because the prosecution did not offer it to prove a rape oc-
curred, but to clarify the victim's seemingly inconsistent behav-
ior.
Because the courts do allow evidence of RTS under cer-
tain circumstances, it may be possible to allow its use in
post-penetration rape cases because of the special circumstanc-
es involved concerning the burden of proof. If evidence of
RTS were allowed in post-penetration rape cases the jury
would have more evidence to consider in determining whether
to believe the defendant's version of the facts or the victim's,
which as mentioned previously, is usually the most debated
issue.
It may be helpful to illustrate the legal implications of the
Vela decision by applying its holding to three hypothetical
factual situations.
136. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450
(1984).
137. 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982).
138. Id. at 478, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
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1. Case 1
The first case is the most extreme of the three. A man and
a woman are on their first date. When they return home they
decide to have sexual intercourse. Initially the woman con-
sents. However, in the middle of the act the man becomes
violent and begins to pull her hair and choke her.13 9 She
withdraws her consent but he forces her to continue the act
against her will.
Under Vela, there would be no rape in this case because
the consent was withdrawn after penetration. However, the
man may be guilty of assault or battery. This case illustrates
the injustice the Vela holding will cause. Although the woman
initially consented to the sexual intercourse, she was forced to
continue against her will after revoking her consent. Because
the sexual act involves penetration, the defendant should face
some form of rape charge instead of a charge of sexual bat-
tery. The Vela decision would result in a holding that no rape
had taken place under these circumstances and thus the defen-
dant would only be guilty of a sexual battery.
2. Case 2
In contrast to the first case, consider a case in which a
man and woman engage in sexual intercourse and the woman
simply changes her mind. 4 ° She then expresses her desire to
stop but he protests and she acquiesces, without saying any-
thing further.
As in case one, the Vela court would not convict the man
of rape because the intercourse was initially consensual. This
decision is not unjust. Although the woman withdrew her con-
sent and communicated this to the defendant, he did not force
her to continue against her will. She merely changed her mind.
As emphasized in Robinson, a woman's mere change of mind
will not transform an initially consensual sexual intercourse
into rape because the elements of rape are not present. In this
case it would be unfair to convict the defendant of
139. See State v. Brodniak, 221 Mont. 212, 216, 718 P.2d 322, 325 (1986).
140. Her reason for this change of mind is irrelevant. For example, she may
feel pangs of guilt if she is married to someone else, she may be late for an
appointment or the intercourse may be painful.
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post-penetration rape because he did not forcibly compel the
woman to continue the sexual intercourse against her will.
3. Case 3
Finally, consider an intermediate case. The facts are simi-
lar to those in the first two cases. The woman initially con-
sents, however, sometime after penetration she withdraws her
consent, for any reason, and clearly communicates her desire
to her partner. Her partner does not comply and continues.
She again relates her wish to end the sexual intercourse. At
this point, her partner calls her some names and tells her she
had better submit "or else." The woman, who has never before
witnessed this side of her partner, becomes fearful and submits
in the hope that he will not harm her.
Again, as in cases one and two, Vela would not classify this
as rape. As in the first case, this result is unjust. In this case,
the victim clearly communicated her withdrawal of consent to
the defendant and, therefore, the defendant cannot claim a
defense of consent. Therefore, because the elements of rape
were present after the victim revoked her consent, the court
should find the defendant guilty of some form of rape.
The above hypotheticals illustrate the injustices possible
with the application of the Vela rule. To rectify the problems
presented by the Vela decision, an amendment to the Califor-
nia Penal Code is needed. An amendment is preferable to a
reversal of the Vela decision because the legislative process is
more conducive to input from the community. This comment
proposes the following amendment which would punish
post-penetration rape as second degree rape.
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Proposed Statutes Pertaining to the Definition and Punishment
of Post-penetration Rape
Because a defendant who is guilty of post-penetration rape
deserves a harsher sentence than that given a defendant con-
victed of an assault or battery, this comment proposes a modi-
fication to the California Penal Code. The proposed statute
creates a section defining post-penetration rape. In addition,
the proposed statute alters section 264 of the California Penal
Code which provides punishment for rape and unlawful sexual
[Vol. 31804
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intercourse. Section 264 currently provides the punishment for
rape, rape of spouse, and unlawful sexual intercourse. In es-
sence, the current statute classifies sexual offenses into three
degrees by providing different penalties for rape, rape of
spouse, and unlawful sexual intercourse. The proposed statute
clarifies the concept of degrees of rape by providing punish-
ment for first and second degree rape in addition to punish-
ment for unlawful sexual intercourse. The proposed statute
classifies rape as defined in section 261 as first degree rape
and post-penetration rape and rape of spouse as second de-
gree rape with a correspondingly lesser punishment than first
degree rape. Punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse is not
classified in terms of degrees but is included in the section
providing punishment for first and second degree rape. A pro-
posed statute follows:
262.5. Post-penetration rape
A person is guilty of post-penetration rape if the person
forces another to continue an initially consensual act of
sexual intercourse against the other's will by threats of
immediate or future harm against the victim or another.
262.6 Post-penetration rape-withdrawal of consent
(a) In a rape as defined in section 262.5, the person with-
drawing consent must clearly communicate his or her with-
drawal of consent. Clear communication of a withdrawal
of consent means withdrawal of consent in such a way that
a reasonable person would be aware that consent has been
withdrawn.
(b) It is a defense to post-penetration rape that a person
reasonably and in good faith believed that the other per-
son did not withdraw their consent.
264. Punishment for rape and unlawful sexual intercourse
(A) First degree rape
Rape as defined in section 261 is first degree rape and is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three,
six, or eight years.
(B) Second degree rape
Rape as defined in sections 262 and 262.5 is second de-
gree rape and is punishable by either imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than one year or in the state pris-
on for three, four or five years.
(C) Unlawful sexual intercourse
Unlawful sexual intercourse as defined in section 261.5 is
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail or the state
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prison for a term not to exceed one year.
B. Proposed Statute Pertaining to Rape Trauma Syndrome
In addition to enacting a statute giving the definition and
punishment for post-penetration rape, a statute is needed to
allow an exception for the use of Rape Trauma Syndrome as
evidence. The proposed statute allows RTS to be used in case
of post-penetration rape to give the jury one more piece of
evidence to aid in its determination of whether the sexual
intercourse was completely consensual. Notwithstanding the
use of RTS, the prosecution must still prove that after consent
was withdrawn by the victim and communicated to the defen-
dant, the defendant committed all of the elements required to
sustain a charge of rape. A proposed statute follows:
There slall be an exception to the rule established in Peo-
ple v. Bledsoe, which prohibits the use of Rape Trauma
Syndrome, to prove that a rape occurred in cases involving
post-penetration rape. Notwithstanding this exception, to
convict a defendant of post-penetration rape, the prosecu-
tion must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim
withdrew her initial consent after penetration, communi-
cated her withdrawal to the defendant and the defendant
forced the victim to continue the sexual intercourse with
force and against her will.
In order to understand the differences between the cur-
rent law and the proposed statute, it may be helpful to apply
the proposed statute to the three hypotheticals discussed
above.
1. Case 1
Case one involved a woman who withdrew her consent in
midact when her partner became violent. Although current law
did not find a rape in. this situation because the woman con-
sented at the moment of penetration, the defendant could be
charged with post-penetration rape under the proposed stat-
ute. The woman clearly communicated her withdrawal of con-
sent to the man. However, he continued the sexual intercourse
with force and against her will. Under the proposed statute the
man is guilty of post-penetration rape.
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2. Case 2
Case two involved a woman who did not clearly communi-
cate her withdrawal of consent to her partner. The treatment
of this case under the proposed statute is identical to the treat-
ment it would receive under the current law. The proposed
statute would not find a rape under these circumstances be-
cause although the woman withdrew her consent she was not
forced against her will to continue the sexual intercourse. In
other words, the elements of rape were not present after the
woman communicated her initial revocation of consent. The
woman merely changed her mind, communicated that fact to
her partner and then acquiesced when her partner began to
protest. In this case it would be unfair to convict the woman's
partner of post-penetration rape because he did not use com-
pulsion to force her to continue the sexual intercourse. This
lack of compulsion differentiates case one from case two.
3. Case 3
The facts of case three were intermediate to cases one and
two. Case three involved a situation where the woman clearly
communicated her withdrawal of consent and was forced by
the defendant to continue the sexual intercourse. The pro-
posed statute would result in a decision different than that
reached under the current law. The current law did not find a
rape in this situation. The proposed statute would result in
defendant being charged with post-penetration rape because
the woman clearly communicated her withdrawal of consent to
her partner.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment was to propose a statutory
alternative to the decision the court reached in People v.
Vela. 4' Although the law of rape has advanced, the Vela
court's refusal to recognize post-penetration rape as rape il-
lustrates that it has not come far enough.
The California Penal Code specifically states that "the guilt
of the crime of rape is the outrage to the person and the feel-
141. 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1985).
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ings of the victim."142 This focus was overlooked in the Vela
decision. By holding that post-penetration rape is not rape but
merely an assault or battery, the Vela court counteracts the
purpose of focusing on the outrage to the feelings of the vic-
tim in a rape case. The proposed statute attempts to rectify the
Vela decision by punishing post-penetration rape as rape and
not as an assault or battery. Furthermore, this comment also
recommended allowing the use of Rape Trauma Syndrome as
evidence in post-penetration rape cases in order to give the
jury an additional piece of evidence for purposes of determin-
ing whether to believe the defendant or the victim.
Amy McLellan
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West 1988).
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